ABSTRACT The first identity-based fully homomorphic encryption (IBFHE) scheme was constructed from identity-based encryption (IBE) and lattice-based cryptography by Gentry, Sahai, and Waters in CRYPTO 2013. Their IBFHE scheme is improved in this paper, exploiting Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert's tight and simple noise analysis method when evaluating homomorphically and Micciancio and Peikert's powerful and novel trapdoor. Furthermore, using the masking scheme(Mukherjee and Wichs in EUROCRYPT 2016), we construct an efficient multi-identity fully homomorphic encryption (MIFHE) scheme by expanding a ''fresh'' ciphertext under a single identity key to an ''expanded'' one under a combined key that enables ciphertexts under different identities to be homomorphically evaluated.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an important extension of public-key encryption (PKE) [23] , fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) allows ciphertexts to be operated homomorphically on any computable function without decrypting them first by a third party without any knowledge of the private key and messages, which is a superb property in cloud computing. Ideal lattices were used to achieve the first FHE by Gentry in [23] . And ever since then, a large number of FHE schemes were constructed based on lattices [4] , [7] , [10] - [12] , [22] , [25] - [28] , [49] or integers [14] , [17] - [19] , [21] , [30] , [35] . In addition, various types of applications of FHE have appeared, such as secure multi-party computation [38] , computation on outsourced data [52] , proxy re-encryption [50] , [51] , fully
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homomorphic signature [54] , and secure convolutional neural network [55] .
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is another essential extension of PKE [34] , which allows encryption to take only the target identity id and public parameters, aside from a message µ, so that broadcasting the user-specific public key in advance is unnecessary. The first realization of IBE schemes were based on Bilinear Diffie-Hellman [5] or Quadratic Residues [20] . Ever since then, a great variety of IBE schemes were constructed based on pairing [6] , [37] or lattices [1] , [2] , [13] , [24] .
Inevitably, IBFHE that brings together the benefits of both IBE and FHE, attracts researchers' attention. The first IBFHE scheme was achieved by Gentry, Sahai and Waters in CRYPTO 2013 [25] using a special compiler which allows all lattice-based IBE schemes [1] , [2] , [13] , [24] to be compiled into IBFHE schemes. In STOC 2012, López-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan [42] coined the notion of multi-key FHE (MKFHE) and constructed the first one based on NTRU [44] followed by [39] , [41] , [43] . Recently, Chen, Chillotti, and Song proposed an MKFHE scheme [47] based on TFHE [48] , and they were the first one to implement an MKFHE scheme.
Multi-identity FHE (MIFHE) is an identity-based version of MKFHE. In CRYPTO 2015, Clear and McGoldrick [15] constructed the first MIFHE scheme in the random oracle model based on the GPV-IBE scheme [24] , which was simplified by Mukherjee and Wichs [38] who presented a construction of MKFHE in EUROCRYPT 2016. The schemes stated above are leveled homomorphic, i.e., requiring some circuits bounded by a polynomial-depth to be given in advance. The first non-leveled IBFHE scheme was constructed by Clear and McGoldrick [16] supposing the existence of indistinguishable obfuscators, followed by [40] .
A. CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, the ABB-IBE scheme [1] is prompted exploiting Micciancio-Peikert's novel trapdoor [29] (called MP12-trapdoor) to achieve shorter parameters. Micciancio and Peikert [29] claimed that all lattice-based cryptography with a trapdoor comprising ABB-IBE can be optimized using their trapdoor (see also [32] ). However, they did not expound details. It is non-trivial to take full advantage of MP12-trapdoor in IBE because noises should be carefully devised when encrypting for security reasons. In the manner of designing noises in [1] , we are ignorant of how to simulate the attack context when showing security, and thus unaware of how to realize the reduction from the security of the IBE scheme to the hardness of learning with errors (LWE) problem. The security proof in [1] is followed in this paper in a high level, though from a technical perspective they differ in many details. Our proposed scheme is extendable, which enables a hierarchical one as that in [1] , [25] , as well as the ring setting for less storage space and higher efficiency.
In addition, we propose an IBFHE scheme compiling the new IBE scheme above. On the one hand, Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [4] used the gadget matrix method, which will be adopted in our construction, to replace the operations of Powerof2, BitDecomp and Flattening [25] . This yields a few advantages. In particular, appropriately randomizing noises reduces the growth rate of noise under homomorphic evaluation and exploiting subgaussianity makes analyzing the noise level easier. On the other hand, the approximate eigenvector method [25] is used in our construction to remove the evaluation key during homomorphic operations.
Our main contribution is to present a construction of efficient leveled MIFHE. In CRYPTO 2015, Clear and McGoldrick [15] proposed the masking system technique and constructed the first MIFHE scheme. Later, in EUROCRYPT 2016, using the gadget matrix and the masking system, Mukherjee and Wichs [38] proposed an MKFHE scheme. Based on these techniques, we manage to expand a ciphertext under a key for a single identity to a ciphertext under a combined key for all identities, so that homomorphic operations of ciphertexts under different identities are permitted. The proposed MIFHE scheme has a smaller growth rate of noise when operating NAND-circuits compared with Clear and McGoldrick's scheme.
Part of this work was published in Network and System Security (NSS) 2015 [53] . This is the full version.
B. PAPER ORGANIZATION
In Section II, some necessary foundation of lattices and relevant tools are given. The optimized IBE scheme is elaborated in Section III. In Section IV, we propose a leveled IBFHE construction that compiles our IBE scheme. We present our INDr-sID-CPA secure leveled MIFHE construction in Section V. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
There are some notations that we will use throughout this paper. Matrices are represented by bold uppercase letters (e.g., A, B), column vectors by bold lowercase letters (e.g., a, b), the i th -entry of a by the notation of a[i], the n-dimensional identity matrix by I n , the Euclidean norm by the notation of a 2 = a 2 i , the concatenation of two matrices by the notation of [A B], and the concatenation of two column vectors by the notation of [a, b].
Let n denote the security parameter throughout the paper. We define [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} for any positive integer n. Let Negl(n) denote a negligible function that grows slower than n −c for any constant c > 0 and any sufficiently large value of n. An event occurs with an overwhelming probability, i.e., it occurs with a probability of at least 1 − negl(n). For two distributions X and Y parameterized by the security parameter, if they are statistically indistinguishable, then we write X stat ≈ Y. Similarly, if they are computationally indistinguishable, then we write X comp ≈ Y.
A. IBE, IBFHE, AND MIFHE
An IBE scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
• Setup(1 n ): Output a master secret key msk, a master public key mpk and public parameters params.
• Extract(pramas, mpk, msk, id): Take pramas, mpk, msk and an identity id as input and output a user's secret key sk id for id.
• Enc(pramas, mpk, id, µ): Output a ciphertext c that encrypts a message µ to the identity id.
• Dec(pramas, c, sk id ): Output the decryption of a ciphertext using the knowledge of sk id . IBE can be generalized to IBFHE that holds the fifth algorithm:
• Eval(f , params, id, c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c t ): Given a computable function f and ciphertexts c i ← Enc(params, id, µ i ) (i = 1, 2, . . . , t), a third party without the knowledge of the secret key and messages can still calculate a new ciphertext c encrypting f (µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ t ). Homomorphically executing circuits with high depth is quite ineffective, thus, in general, some L is required to restrict the function's depth, in which case it would be called leveled IBFHE. The leveled version will be considered primarily in our paper, hence ''leveled'' is neglected for the sake of simplicity.
An MIFHE scheme is an IBFHE scheme that allows homomorphic operations of ciphertexts under different identities. It has an additional algorithm Expand that expands a ''fresh'' ciphertext c i under a single identity key to an ''expanded'' oneĉ i under a combined key.
Security. Semantical security under chosen-identity-attack and chosen-plaintext-attack (IND-ID-CPA) is supposed to be satisfied by IBE schemes. This security model has two variants. A weaker one (IND-sID-CPA) imposes a restriction on the adversary who must declare the identity to be attacked before obtaining public parameters. A stronger one (INDr-ID-CPA) entails the ciphertext being indistinguishable from a random member in the ciphertext space and indicates recipient anonymity.
We consider the security model of IBE and those of IBFHE and MIFHE as equal in disregard of the evaluation and expansion algorithms because they are public, and do not compromise security levels.
The INDr-sID-CPA security game for IBE (IBFHE, or MIFHE) is took into account in our paper. Let us recall a security game between a PPT adversary and a challenger. There are five stages of the game.
• Setup: Not until the identity to be attacked is obtained from the adversary, does the challenger run Setup algorithm to gain (params, mpk, msk). params, mpk are then returned to the adversary.
• Queries 1: The adversary may adaptively select id j (id j = id * ) and enquire about the corresponding secret key for no more than polynomial times from the challenger.
• Challenge: The adversary chooses and sends a message µ * from the plaintext space to the challenger who then selects a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger sets the challenge ciphertext, regarded as the IBE (IBFHE, or MIFHE) challenge, to be c * ← Enc(params, mpk, id * , µ * ) if b = 0, and to be a ciphertext randomly chosen from the ciphertext space otherwise. The challenge c * is then sent back to the adversary.
• Queries 2: The adversary issues additional adaptive queries up to polynomial times and receives responses as in Queries 1.
• Guess: The adversary wins if a guess b is output and b = b, and loses otherwise.
The adversary has the advantage of Pr
2 . An IBE (IBFHE, or MIFHE) scheme is said to be INDr-sID-CPA secure if the adversary has the advantage less than some negligible function negl(λ).
B. HASHING AND SUBGAUSSIANITY
Here, we recall some facts about hash function and subgaussianity.
Hashing. Given two finite sets A and B, a family of functions H mapping A to B is said to be 2-universal if Pr
Let D be a distribution over {−1, 0, 1} that outputs 0 with a probability of 0.5, -1 with a probability of 0.25, and 1 with a probability of 0.25 (the notation of D will be used throughout this paper to denote this distribution). Following is a variant of the leftover hash lemma.
Lemma 1 ( [3] ): Given an integer k ≥ 1 and a finite abelian group B, the mapping
Subgaussian Random Variable. In this work, it is conducive to manipulate the growth rate of noise using the subgaussian random variable. Given a real random variable X , if we have Pr[|X | > t] ≤ 2 exp(−πt 2 /s 2 ) for all t ≥ 0, then it is said to be subgaussian with parameter s ≥ 0. It is self-evident that any B-bounded 0-mean random variable X is subgaussian with parameter B √ 2π . In addition, the gaussian tail that has the expectation of zero indicates subgaussianity. More information about subgaussianity is available in [36] . The following lemma is useful to analyze the change of noise under homomorphic evaluation.
Lemma 2 ( [9] ): Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k be independent, 0-mean, real subgaussian random variables with parameter s
Similarly, we say a random real vector a is subgaussian with parameter s, if a, u ∈ R is subgaussian with equal parameter s for all unit vector u, which implies that the concatenation of independent subgaussian random variables with the same parameter s is subgaussian with parameter s. Subgaussianity has a matrix version as well. In summary, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 ( [36] ): Let X ∈ R n×m be a subgaussian random matrix with parameter s. There exists a constant c > 0 such that, with an overwhelming probability,
for all unit vector u.
C. LATTICES AND HARD PROBLEMS
For a vector u ∈ Z n q and a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , define:
Note that ⊥ u (A) is a shift of ⊥ (A). LWE. The learning with errors (LWE) problem plays a vital role in lattice-based cryptography. We define the search LWE (LWE n,m,q,χ ) problem as follow.
For a positive integer n, a prime q, an uniformly random secret vector s $ ← Z n q and a distribution χ over Z q , randomly choose an error term e ← χ and a vector a
Given m = poly(n) independent instances from A s,χ , the LWE n,m,q,χ problem is to find the secret vector s.
The LWE problem has an important decisional version that will be used in this paper. Given m independent instances sampled either from the uniform distribution over Z n q × Z q , or from A s,χ , the decisional learning with errors (DLWE n,m,q,χ ) problem is to determine which distribution these samples come from. The DLWE assumption says that these two distributions are computationally indistinguishable. For simplicity, DLWE n,m,q,α is frequently used to denote DLWE n,m,q,χ and A s,α to denote A s,χ for χ = D Z,αq .
It is generally known that the DLWE n,m,q,α problem in the average-case is as hard as approximation lattices problems with approximation factors of O(n/α) in the worst-case by quantum or classical reductions, when αq ≥ 2 √ n [8] , [29] , [31] , [33] . Lattices Trapdoor. Our constructions will make use of the following results including the MP12-trapdoor generation algorithm, subgaussian sampling algorithm and Gaussian sampling algorithm [29] while neglecting the details of implementation because they are not strictly required.
Given a prime q > 2 and = log q , define Lemma 5 ( [4] , [29] ): Given any matrix A ∈ Z n×m 0 q , there exists an efficiently randomized algorithm that samples a subgaussian matrix X with some constant parameter O(1) over Z m 1 ×m 0 q such that X = G −1 (A), where the gadget matrix G is specified as above.
Lemma 6 ( [29] ): Using the parameters described in lemma 4, given a uniformly random vector u ∈ Z n q , there exists an efficient algorithm SampleD(R, A 0 , H, u, s) that samples a vector t over D m Z,s·ω(
for some s ∈ R and ω( √ log n) satisfying A · t = u.
III. IDENTITY BASED ENCRYPTION
Utilizing the MP12-trapdoor, an IBE scheme with optimized parameters that improves ABB-IBE [1] is constructed in this section. Micciancio and Peikert [29] claimed that all lattice-based cryptography with a trapdoor can be optimized using their trapdoor. However, they lacked details of optimization that was de facto non-trivial because noises should be carefully devised for security reasons. We will elaborate the noise, and our construction will be showed to be INDr-sID-CPA secure as long as the DLWE assumption holds.
A. THE BASIC IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION
Recall that n is the security parameter. We start with describing some public parameters that will be used throughout this section.
-The modulus q is a sufficiently large prime q = poly(n).
and R ← D m 0 ×m 1 . See also [29] for more information about this regularity. In addition, sampling R ← D
leads to mildly larger parameters. -Every identity is assumed to have a counterpart element in GF(q n ).
is said to be an invertible difference, if H is computable in polynomial time in n and H(id 1 ) − H(id 2 ) is invertible for any two different identities id 1 , id 2 (for more information, please refer to [1] ).
-The LWE error rate α is supposed be sufficiently large satisfying αq ≥ 2 √ n. We now give a formal description of our basic IBE construction.
• • IBE.Extract(pramas, mpk, msk, id): Given id ∈ Z n q , compute H(id) and set A id = [A 0 A 1 + H(id) · G] (Note that R is an MP12-trapdoor of A id with tag H(id)). Sample a vector t ∈ Z m with small entries satisfying A id · t = u by running the algorithm SampleD(R, A 0 , H(id), u, R 2 ). Set the secret key and public key for id as sk id = s = (1, −t) and pk id 
• IBE.Enc(pramas, pk id , id, µ ∈ {0, 1}): Given a message µ ∈ {0, 1}, randomly select two vectors y 2 , which exerts a remarkable function on the proof of security.
The parameters specified in Section III ensures the decryption in our IBE construction to work correctly with an overwhelming probability.
Proof 1: It is self-evident that
where short vector t = (t 0 , t 1 ) ∈ Z m 0 × Z m 1 . We now bound
By lemma 3, we have
with an overwhelming probability. So, by lemma 12 in [1], we get
By the setting of our parameters, we have | e 1 , t 1 | ≤ m 1.5 0 · ω( √ log n) 3 with an overwhelming probability. Similarly, | e 0 , t 0 | ≤ m 1.5 0 · ω( √ log n) 3 with an overwhelming probability. Obviously, we have |e| ≤ αq √ n. Hence | c, s | ≤ m 1.5 0 · ω( √ log n) 3 , which completes the proof.
The parameters of our basic IBE scheme is compared with that of the ABB-IBE scheme [1] in Table 1 , from which we find that our scheme has optimized parameters.
C. SECURITY
In this subsection, our IBE construction is proved to be INDrsID-CPA secure.The security proof in [1] is followed in a high level, though that of CCA-secure PKE in [29] is followed from a technical perspective.
Theorem 1: The basic IBE construction in subsection III-A is INDr-sID-CPA secure assuming that the DLWE n,m 0 +1,q,α assumption holds.
Proof 2: We show the reduction to the hardness of the DLWE problem as below.
Instance. The challenger receives DLWE instances
] that are sampled either from A y,α or uniformly.
Targeting. The PPT adversary announces the challenge identity id * to be attacked.
Setup. The challenger simulates the attack context for the adversary as follows. A 0 = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m = (n, q, , m 0 , m 1 , m, G) , mpk.
1) Assemble
In the adversary's view, the master public-key mpk is negl(n)-far from uniform in statistical distance because of the selection of m 0 and D.
Identity-secret-key Query 1. The adversary can issue adaptive queries no more than polynomial times. To respond a secret key query for id j , the challenger sets
If id j = id * , MP12-trapdoor R can be used to sample a short vector t from
is sent back as the response. However, if id j = id * , a short vector t is not supposed to be sampled from ⊥ u (A id j ) because the trapdoor-functionality disappears. Thus, all queries other than id * is appropriately responded, which means the query is perfectly simulated by the challenger.
Challenge. The challenger receives a message µ * ∈ {0, 1} chosen by the adversary for the target identity id * , and simulates a challenge ciphertext as follows: Identity-secret-key Queries 2. The adversary issues additional adaptive queries up to polynomial times and receives responses as in Identity-secret-key Queries 1.
Guess. The challenger sets a guess b to be the same as the guess output by the adversary.
We claim that c * is indistinguishable from a fresh ciphertext of µ * for id * if the DLWE instances are sampled from We have
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that for settled e 0 , every r T i · e 0 +ê i is negl(n)-far from D Z,s , where s 2 = ( e 0 2 2 + m 0 α 2 q 2 ) · ω( √ log n) 2 , over the randomness of r i and ofê i . The claim follows by the security proof of CCA-PKE in [29] but adapted from discrete Gaussian variable to discrete subgaussian variable because each of r i is independent discrete subgaussian.
In addition, we claim that the challenge ciphertext c * is uniform if the DLWE instances are uniformly random. Obviously, both b 0 and b * are uniform. By lemma 1, −R T b * is uniform and independent over Z m 1 q . Thus, −R T b * + 2ê is uniform, which means that the challenge ciphertext c * is uniform over Z m+1 q . This completes the proof.
IV. IDENTITY-BASED FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
A leveled IBFHE scheme is formally described in this section based on our basic IBE construction, and the proposed IBFHE is more efficient compared with GSW-IBFHE [25] .
A. THE IDENTITY-BASED FHE SCHEME
As in the previous section, we start with describing some public parameters that will be used throughout this section.
-Let L be the maximum multiplication depth of circuit that is allowed to be evaluated homomorphically, and q be a sufficiently large prime q = q(n, L). Set , m 0 , m 1 , m, G, D and H as specified in the subsection III-A. -We define another gadget matrix
, where, by lemma 5, given any matrix A ∈ Z (m+1)×(m+1) q , there exists an efficiently randomized algorithm that samples a subgaussian matrix X with some constant parameter
A formal description of our IBFHE construction is given as below. L, q, , m 0 , m 1 , m, G, M, ) , mpk, msk.
• IBFHE.Extract(pramas, mpk, R, id): Run the IBE.
Extract algorithm to generate pk id = P = [u A id ] and sk id = s = (1, −t). Recall that, as specified in the basic IBE scheme,
with tag H(id)), and the vector t ∈ Z m with small entries satisfying A id · t = u is sampled by running the algorithm SampleD(R, A 0 , H(id), u, R 2 ). Output pk id , sk id . Note that P · s = 0.
• IBFHE.Enc(pramas, pk id , id, µ ∈ {0, 1}): Given a message µ, randomly select two matrices 
• IBFHE.Dec(pramas, C, sk id ): Output µ = c, s mod q mod 2, where c is the first column of the ciphertext matrix C.
• IBFHE.NAND(pramas, C 1 , C 2 ): Given two ciphertext matrices C 1 , C 2 under an identical identity for two plaintexts µ 1 , µ 2 , homomorphic addition is defined as
and homomorphic multiplication is defined as
With these operations, we can define
Output C NAND . Observe that M −1 (·) is randomized, and so is this algorithm.
• IBFHE.Eval(pramas, f , C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C t ): An NANDcircuit f : {0, 1} t → {0, 1} is applied to a set of ciphertexts C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C t , which leads to a ciphertext C f .
B. ANALYSIS
In this subsection, the correctness, security and homomorphic property are analyzed.
Correctness. The decryption algorithm in our IBFHE construction works correctly because for a ciphertext C ∈ Z (m+1)×(m+1) q and a secret key s ∈ Z m+1 , we have
Thus, we have c, s = µ + 2 · (−e 1 , −e 0,1 , e 1,1 ), s , where c is set to be the first column of C. The first entry of s is 1, and the first entry of of the first column of M is 1. Thus, the former equation about c, s is true because of the manner of the multiplication of a matrix and a vector. The correctness follows with an overwhelming probability if we assign the parameters as in the section III by lemma 7. Security. Exploiting a standard hybrid analysis, we claim that the INDr-sID-CPA security of the IBFHE construction can be deduced directly from that of our basic IBE scheme by theorem 1. A ciphertext C of a bit 0 in IBFHE.Enc can be considered as the concatenation of (m + 1) ciphertexts of a bit 0 in IBE.Enc. Hence, the claim follows because C is indistinguishable from C + M (a valid ciphertext of a bit 1).
Homomorphic Property. Lemma 8: Let two fresh ciphertexts be C 1 , C 2 such that
We then have with an overwhelming probability that
In addition, the decryption works correctly after one-time 3 . Proof 3: For any two fresh cipertexts C 1 , C 2 , we have
By lemma 7, it holds that
Therefore, we get
Hence, the decryption works correctly after one-time homomorphic NAND evaluation.
The continuous use of the above lemma leads to our IBFHE construction being an L-leveled one. We observe that the level of noise roughly grows from O(m 1.5 0 ) · ω(
Theorem 2: Given a NAND-circuit f for the depth of L, the decryption of our IBFHE construction works correctly with an overwhelming probability if all inputs are fresh ciphertexts and the parameter satisfies
Remark: We observe that the noise grows asymmetrically during homomorphic evaluation, thus the techniques in [4] can be used to further optimize the parameters. However, our IBFHE scheme is not bootstrappable because of the lack of the evaluation key encrypting user's secret key that is needed in the bootstrapping algorithm. In effect, it destroys the anonymity and the indistinguishability between a ciphertext matrix and a random matrix from ciphertext space.
V. MULTI-IDENTITY FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
An MIFHE scheme is an IBFHE scheme that allows homomorphic operations of ciphertexts under different identities. In this section, we present a leveled MIFHE scheme, based on the IBFHE scheme proposed in the preceding section. It is accomplished by adding an expansion algorithm that expands a ''fresh'' ciphertext under a single identity key to an ''expanded'' one under a combined key.
A. MASKING SCHEME
The main technique we use in this section was coined as a masking scheme in [15] . Without loss of generality, let us consider the case that we want to homomorphically operate two ciphertexts C 1 and C 2 encrypting µ 1 and µ 2 under two different identities id 1 and id 2 respectively. However, IBFHE is not supposed to provide such functionality. A masking scheme is capable of expanding a ''fresh'' ciphertext C 1 into an ''expanded'' oneĈ 1 which is allowed to be homomorphically operated with other expanded ciphertextĈ 2 derived from other identity id 2 .
In particular, say s 1 and s 2 are secret keys for identities id 1 and id 2 . We want the expanded ciphertext to be decrypted likewise, i.e.,
Linear Combination. Before showing the concrete masking scheme, we need an algorithm coined as the linear combination in [38] .
• LinearComb((V (1,1) ,
is the β-noisy encryption of the a th ∈ [n] row and b th ∈ [(m + 1) ] column entry of a matrix Y ∈ {0, 1} n×(m+1) in the IBFHE scheme for the secret key s ∈ Z
, where E x,y is an (m + 1) × (m + 1) matrix that has 1 in the x th row and y th column, and 0's in all other entries. Output
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 9:
The preceding algorithm LinearComb ((V (1,1) ,
with the noise e 2 ≤ m(m + 1) 2 β. Proof 4: The correctness of this lemma follows because:
where E (a,b) is the noise contained in V (a,b) that has the magnitude of ( Masking Scheme. Adopting the public parameters in the previous section, the masking scheme consists of three parts.
Output a tuple of vectors
N .
• GenEnc(params, pk id i , id i , µ i ): On input params, pk id , an identity id i , a message µ i , compute the encryption
Decompose a matrix that has every entry in Z q to matrices in binary representation
is the encryption randomness and Y
Output a tuple of encryption CIPHER i = (C i , U i ).
• CipherMask(params, id i , KeyMask i ): On input params, an identity id i , and
Correctness and Security. The previous masking scheme is ''correct'', i.e., for any j ∈ [N ]\{i} ,
with the noise e i,j 2 ≤ (m + 1) 3 β assuming the ciphertext C i is β-noisy.
The correctness of the masking scheme follows because:
By the property of the linear combination (lemma 9), the error terms
By means of a hybrid argument, the semantic security of our IBFHE construction implies that: GenEnc(params, id i , 1) ).
The matrix-vector leftover hash lemma [45] implies that:
into a binary one Y i ← {0, 1} n×(m+1) , we will get a simpler version of the masking scheme. However, this method compromises the size of parameters. Specifically, that would base the security of our constructions on the hardness of LWE with binary secrets which restricts the secret to a binary vector at the cost of increasing the dimension by a factor of log q [46] .
B. OUR MIFHE SCHEME
Just like the IBFHE scheme, we start with describing some public parameters that will be used throughout this section.
-Let N be the maximum number of identities the scheme can support, L be the maximum multiplication depth of circuit that is allowed to be evaluated homomorphically, and q be a sufficiently large prime q = q(n, L, N ). Set , m 0 , m 1 , m, G, D, H, M as specified in the section IV. Note that G is defined in the subsection III-A, while M is defined in the subsection IV-A.
, by lemma 5, there exists an efficiently randomized algorithm that samples a subgaussian matrix X with some constant parameter
Finally, a formal description of our MIFHE construction is given as below. L, N , q, , m 0 , m 1 , m, G, M,M) , mpk, msk.
• MIFHE.Extract(params, mpk, msk,
Recall that, as specified in the IBFHE scheme,
(note that R is an MP12-trapdoor of A id with tag H(id)), and the vector t ∈ Z m with small entries satisfying A id · t = u is sampled by running the algorithm SampleD(R,
• MIFHE.Enc(params, pk id i , id i , µ i ∈ {0, 1}): To encrypt a bit µ i ∈ {0, 1}, compute
Output CIPHER i .
• MIFHE.Expand(params, id i , CIPHER i , KeyMask i ): To encrypt a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, compute
Expand the fresh ciphertext to an expanded one. For
We regard these matrices as sub-matrices and concatenate them into a big onê
• MIFHE.Dec(params,Ĉ, (sk i ) i∈ [N ] ): This algorithm is basically identical to IBFHE.Dec. Given an expanded ciphertextĈ, set the combined keyŝ = [s 1 , · · · , s N ], and letĉ be the first column ofĈ. Output µ = ĉ,ŝ mod q mod 2.
• MIFHE.NAND(params, C 1 , C 2 ): This algorithm is basically identical to IBFHE.NAND. Given two expanded ciphertext matricesĈ 1 ,Ĉ 2 for two plaintexts µ 1 , µ 2 , computeĈ NAND ← IBFHE.NAND with the expanded dimension (m + 1)N × (m + 1) N and M,M −1 (·). OutputĈ NAND . Observe thatM −1 (·) is randomized, and so is this algorithm.
• MIFHE.Eval(params, f ,Ĉ 1 ,Ĉ 2 , . . . ,Ĉ t ): An NANDcircuit f : {0, 1} t → {0, 1} is applied to a set of ciphertextsĈ 1 ,Ĉ 2 , . . . ,Ĉ t , which leads to a ciphertextĈ f . Correctness. Correctness of our MIFHE construction follows because: = µ iM Tŝ + 2ê i . So, letĉ i be the first column ofĈ i , we obtain ĉ i ,ŝ = µ i + 2 ·ê i [1] . The first entry ofŝ is 1, and the first entry of of the first column ofM is 1. Thus, the upper equation about ĉ,ŝ is true because of the manner of the multiplication of a matrix and a vector. The decryption works correctly if the parameters satisfieŝ
where β is the noise of the ciphertext C. VOLUME 7, 2019 Security. The security follows directly from the security of our IBFHE scheme in the preceding section according to the semantic security of the masking scheme, because the expansion algorithm is public and does not impact security.
Homomorphic Property. The homomorphic property of the MIFHE scheme follows directly from that of the IBFHE scheme in the preceding section because MIFHE.NAND is basically identical to IBFHE.NAND except with the expanded dimension (m+1)N ×(m+1) N andM,M −1 . The theorem 2 implies that our MIFHE scheme is an L-leveled MIFHE scheme. An L-level homomorphic NAND circuit increases the noise of the ciphertexts by a factor of O( √ (m + 1) N ) L . Then, we have a corresponding theorem. then it holds that the decryption algorithm of our MIFHE construction works correctly with an overwhelming probability. Hence, the decryption correctness follows, which completes the proof.
We compare the parameters of the proposed MIFHE scheme with the CM-MIFHE scheme [15] in Table 2 , from which we can see that our scheme has a smaller noise growth rate when performing homomorphic evaluation. Although these two schemes seem to have the same sizes of the private key and the ciphertext, our construction has a smaller q, which, in effect, leads to smaller sizes of the private key and the ciphertext. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEM
Utilizing the powerful MP-12 trapdoor, a refined IBE scheme was proposed based on the ABB-IBE [1] in this paper. Further, IBFHE and MIFHE schemes with short parameters without compromising security was constructed using Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert's tight and simple noise analysis method as well as Mukherjee and Wichs's masking scheme technique. There is one drawback that the proposed IBFHE scheme and MIFHE scheme are only leveled homomorphic schemes as the GSW-IBFHE scheme. As far as we know, it remains open to build non-leveled ones without using the indistinguishable obfuscator.
